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Abstract 
The report seeks to bring behavioural research methods for privacy to the attention of EU policy-makers. It argues that 
changes in web interface design can be a useful policy alternative to the traditional 'privacy notice' approach. Specifically, 
it examines whether web interface design has effect on people's online privacy behaviour through an online experiment 
(n=3229) in four European countries. Results show that the presence of an anthropomorphic character leads to greater 
disclosure of personal information, both directly and passively and the presence of a privacy notice leads to greater direct 
information disclosure. Additional psychological constructs (such as subjects' awareness that they were revealing personal 
information) were also recorded, and a demographic analysis according to gender, age, education and country of residence 
carried out.   
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Executive Summary  
This report is a contribution to the discussion on how best to ensure citizens’ on-line privacy while 
giving them the freedom to benefit as much as possible from the Internet. It explores whether 
changes in the design of web interfaces (i.e. the choice architecture according to the behavioural 
economics literature) lead to changes in privacy behaviour, and so merit attention as an additional 
policy tool. It builds on two premises: (a) the predominant model of informing users through 
'privacy notices' is ineffective, as people seldom read them and (b) nudges, which are changes in 
the choice architecture to elicit a certain behaviour, have been shown to be effective in other 
domains.  
An on-line experiment (n=3,229) across four European countries examined the effect on privacy 
behaviour of seven nudges. These appeared as changes in the design of a mock search engine's 
user interface (e.g. including an anthropomorphic character, highlighting prior browsing history or 
changing the look-and-feel to convey greater informality). These nudges were tested and 
considered relevant in previous studies (particularly Groom and Calo, 2011). Two types of privacy 
behaviour were measured: passive disclosure, when people unwittingly disclose personal 
information, and direct disclosure, when people make an active choice to reveal personal 
information. 
In addition to directly observing privacy behaviour, the on-line experiment also included a 
questionnaire which sought to capture a series of psychological constructs, such as participants' 
perception that the experiment was trying to get them to reveal personal information inadvertently 
or their feelings of being observed / monitored. It also tested whether participants noticed the 
privacy policy link. 
Selected results 
 Anthropomorphic images increase subjects’ predisposition to disclose personal information, 
either wittingly or unwittingly. This could be due to users 'letting their guard down' following an 
increase in trust due to the presence of an anthropomorphic character (Bente, Dratsch, 
Rehbach, Reyl and Lushaj, 2014).  
 Actively disclosing personal information appears to be a strong cultural trait, but revealing it 
inadvertently less so. For direct disclosure of personal information, there were significant 
differences between countries; but for passive disclosure only Italy stood out from the rest 
(participants there revealed the most personal information inadvertently). 
 Subjects with a higher level of education felt significantly less observed or monitored than 
those with a lower level of education, challenging the assumption that education generates 
greater awareness of privacy risks. However, better-educated participants did reveal less 
personal information inadvertently than less educated ones (no difference in direct disclosure 
of information). 
 Approximately 73% of women answered 'never' to the stigmatized questions, compared to 
27% of males. This large difference could be due to the nature of the questions (e.g. about 
alcohol consumption, which might be more acceptable for males). It could also suggest women 
feel under greater social scrutiny or simply are more cautious when disclosing personal 
information. 
By showing the effect of nudges and demographic variables on privacy behaviour, this study 
highlights the value of a behavioural economics approach to data protection regulation. Further 
tests, either in laboratory or on-line experiments, or directly in the field (for example, when rolling 
out a new government website), should seek to confirm the effect of these changes and test 
additional ones.  
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The implications for policy are that, while nudges are unlikely to solve all the challenges which on-
line privacy regulation faces, they do contribute to a solution. Good, conscientious and evidence-
based website design can lead to more aware and cautious disclosure of personal data. Privacy 
enforcement authorities – at national or EU level – can work together with major web service 
providers (such as Google or Facebook), who have vast amounts of such data at their disposal, 
towards developing a series of 'safe practices in web design'. It is an opportunity to work together 
to achieve innovative and mutually-beneficial solutions to privacy challenges in the online 
environment.  
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I.  Introduction  
The context in which any decision is taken is referred to as the choice architecture in the recent 
nomenclature of behavioural economics. A change in this choice architecture which is intended to 
encourage certain behaviour is considered a nudge, and is distinct from a direct instruction or 
demand (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). Nudges have been shown to influence behaviour across a 
range of policy areas, including on-line privacy behaviour (Acquisti, 2009; Acquisti, Brandimarte and 
Loewenstein, 2015).  
Existing legal safeguards (such as privacy notices that inform users of how their personal data can 
be used) are supposed to foster a privacy-protective behaviour among Internet users. However, 
while they fulfil legal requirements, they have been relatively ineffective in generating more 
cautious approaches to personal data disclosure. A behavioural approach based on changes to the 
choice architecture cannot and should not replace them. It can, however help them to get citizens to 
make choices that are in their best interest.  
This study explored alternative ways of alerting users to the fact that their behaviour on-line 
revealed personal information about themselves. It measured their level of disclosure of personal 
information, as well as their replies to a questionnaire following exposure to different nudges.  
Two types of personal information disclosure were considered: passive, when the user inadvertently 
reveals personal information (by simply browsing the Internet carelessly, for example), and direct, 
when the user purposefully reveals personal information (Groom & Calo, 2011). The distinction has 
policy implications. In passive disclosure, users are not aware they are disclosing personal 
information, and therefore do not take steps to regulate their information disclosure. Disclosure 
occurs inadvertently, out of users' awareness and control. In this case, privacy notices have little or 
no effect at all. Instead, this may be the right domain for a behavioural economics approach, since 
behaviour may simply be automatic and not the result of a thoughtful process. 
The report first provides a literature review on current privacy policies and informed consent 
requirements as legal tools, and discusses some literature on behavioural science applied to public 
policy. It then presents the results of the experiment which tested the impact of different nudges 
on privacy behaviour. It also examines the possible influence of demographic variables such as age, 
gender, education and country of residence, and includes an analysis of self-reported measures 
such as perceptions of disclosure and feelings of being observed.  
 
II.  Background 
In parallel to its key enabling role for economic growth and productivity, digital technology has 
spawned a new era in the disclosure of citizens' personal data. It represents a potential threat to 
privacy and data protection of the citizen, but also offers opportunities for strengthening them1. 
Reinforcing trust in the online environment is essential for the realization of the Internet's potential 
as an engine for European economic growth and innovation2. European Commission President Jean-
Claude Juncker has stressed the need to 'make Europe more trusted and secure online, so that 
citizens and businesses can fully reap the benefits of the digital economy'.3 This objective is also 
                                                 
1  See Charter of Fundamental rights of the European Union, Art 7 and 8, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf.  
2  European Commission, 2012 
3  http://ec.europa.eu/about/juncker-commission/docs/oettinger_en.pdf 
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recognised by the Digital Agenda for Europe (DAE)4, the European Union flagship initiative on all 
ICT-related activities. 
One way to reduce privacy concerns and increase trust is to provide users with good privacy policies 
which increase their awareness and reassure them about the risks involved (Wu, Huang, Yen & 
Popova, 2012). This should be done with caution, however, as offering greater privacy reassurances 
to individuals may lead to increased reluctance to reveal personal information by priming the 
individuals about the sensitivity of their data (Acquisti, 2010b). The role of privacy policies, 
therefore, should be to enable a cautious willingness to disclose personal data while at the same 
time safeguarding privacy and personal data protection (Europoean Commission, 2012). 
The European Commission is addressing these challenges via the reform of the legal framework on 
privacy and data protection in the EU5. Directive 95/46/EC will be replaced by the General Data 
Protection Regulation, henceforth Draft Regulation, which aims to build a stronger and more 
coherent data protection framework in the EU (European Commission, 2012). 
Privacy notices 
Despite establishing these information obligations and consent requirements, the Draft Regulation 
contains few indications on how information should be provided to users or how they could exercise 
their right to object to the processing of their data. This means that, as far as the information 
provision obligations are satisfied, i.e. the minimum of information is provided, the controller is free 
to choose how to provide this information.  
The common instruments usually adopted by data controllers to be compliant with the law are 
privacy notices. These are long, detailed and highly complex statements on how data controllers 
will use their personal data. These notices also provide information about the data subjects' rights 
and the security measures adopted for the safe treatment of their personal data. It is assumed 
that users read these texts, understand them and give their informed consent. 
Individuals are given control of their personal data and expected to weigh the costs and benefits of 
the disclosure of their data themselves. This is an example of a self-management approach to 
privacy issues, whereby users are provided with information and expected to act according to their 
best interests (Solove, 2013).  
These privacy notices have been gradually introduced, either through mandatory regulation (the 
case in the EU) or as self-regulation practices by businesses in response to privacy concerns (the 
case in the US). However, there are a number of problems with this approach. 
Nobody reads privacy notices 
Studies conducted both in Europe (Lusoli, Bacigalupo, Lupiáñez-Villanueva, de Andrade, Monteleone 
& Maghiros, 2012) and outside Europe (Tsai, Cranor, Acquisti & Fong, 2006; McDonald & Cranor, 
2008) have shown that these notices are not effective. They are hard to read and read 
infrequently, least of all by young people (McDonald & Cranor, 2008; Madden, Lenhart, Cortesi, 
Gasser, Duggan, Smith & Beaton, 2013). Generally, users will scroll down the privacy notice and 
rush for the tick box, or simply tick the box without even looking at the notice (when this option is 
available). This habit does not allow them to give their meaningful, informed consent, and limits 
their ability to make 'rational' decisions. 
                                                 
4  See EC Digital Agenda for Europe, available at http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/digital-
agenda/index_en.htm. 
5  The legal framework currently applicable in the field of privacy and data protection is represented mainly 
by Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and 
on the free movement of such data, integrated by the Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of 
personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (so called e-Privacy 
Directive, as modified by the Directive 2009/136/EC, the e-cookies Directive). 
 7 
Information asymmetry 
There is insufficient information for users to make a considered decision about data disclosure 
(Acquisti, 2010b). This is also referred to as 'information asymmetry' between users (they are 
unaware or they do not have enough information on what happens with their data) and data 
controllers (companies or government entities that collect and process users' data). Even if users 
received appropriate and clear information and knew how their data would be treated, they still 
would ignore the consequences of future data use (Borgesius, 2013). This knowledge asymmetry is 
exacerbated by the rise of big data.  
Transaction costs 
Transaction costs, namely the time needed for users to read and interpret privacy notices where 
complete information is provided, make information asymmetry even more difficult to overcome 
(Acquisti & Grossklags, 2007; McDonald & Cranor, 2008; Borgesius, 2013). 
In addition, users face increasing uncertainty in online environments due to the new technological 
capabilities of tracking systems, which can be used in different ways by different actors to gather 
information6. In order to capture these changes, privacy policies change frequently though not 
always transparently, making the task of keeping abreast with the most recent version even more 
difficult for users (Martin, 2013). Transaction costs, therefore, increase. 
Even well-informed and rational individuals sometimes cannot effectively self-manage their 
privacy due to several structural problems: (a) there are too many entities collecting and using 
personal data to make self-management based on the consent model feasible and (b) often 
privacy breaches are the result of an aggregation of pieces of data by different entities (Solove, 
2013).  
Privacy paradox 
Internet users usually claim they are worried about online privacy risks and are aware of their 
privacy rights. Many are concerned that their personal data held by companies may be used for 
purposes other than those for which it was collected (Lusoli et al., 2012). However, most users do 
not act accordingly. They do not read the privacy policies entirely or they find it difficult to obtain 
information about a data controller's practices (Tsai, Cranor, Acquisti & Fong, 2006; Hoofnagle, 
King, Li & Turrow, 2010; Madden et al., 2013). Therefore, providing good, clear and accurate 
information about the risks of disclosing private information is not enough to change behaviour. 
Favours the commercial use of data  
Criticisms of the self-regulation model of privacy policies, in particular in the U.S., point to the fact 
that this model has allowed a sectoral and weak approach to privacy (Solove & Hoofnagle, 2006) 
which favours the commercial use of personal data. As a result, privacy policies without substantial 
safeguards have proliferated. Individual protection has become an illusion rather than a reality: 
users may believe they have more privacy simply because a website has a privacy policy (Haynes, 
2007). 
In sum, current privacy policies which 'take refuge in consent' do not provide people with 
meaningful control over their data (Solove, 2013). Consent in these circumstances is insufficiently 
informed and, therefore, generally not meaningful (Borgesius, 2013). Current policies fall short of 
achieving the objectives of law, namely to ensure that people make considered decisions about 
their privacy, and, ultimately, to increase trust in on-line services. 
 
 
                                                 
6  See Ashkan Soltani’s work for an excellent overview of different methods that are used to track users: 
http://ashkansoltani.org/work/online-tracking. 
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Alternative mechanisms to traditional privacy policies  
As users very often do not read privacy policies, other strategies might be more successful in 
encouraging privacy-protective behaviour. Instead of only using written privacy policies, 
organisations could embrace alternative ways and instruments – more visual, explicit, simple and 
user-friendly – to inform Internet users so that they give better-informed consent, if they give it. 
- Transparency enhancing tools (TETs) would allow citizens to anticipate how they will be profiled 
and what the consequences of this would be (Hildebrandt, 2012). Tools such as Ghostery, 
Privacy Badger and other browser extensions make online tracking more transparent and give 
users the technological means to block trackers. However, not everyone knows about TETs, and 
not everyone can use them or is interested in doing so. They do require people's conscious 
attention and they do require a certain amount of cognitive effort. This takes us back to some 
of the problems encountered with privacy notices. 
- One alternative is to provide simplified, standardized privacy information. These are notices 
which convey a simple message in a standardized format, such as the cookie alerts required by 
the EU. This approach has some benefits. For one, the messages are shorter and easier to 
understand. However, they can also prove to be insufficient, as users may end up ignoring 
these alerts and simply accepting all the requests for consent with a click of the mouse button, 
as a matter of habit (Groom & Calo, 2011). 
- Finally, a privacy by design approach (PbD) (Cavoukian, 2012) advocates good technical design 
which embeds privacy into IT systems and business practices from the outset (and doesn’t just 
add privacy measures ex-post). It proposes seven 'foundational principles' to offer the highest 
degree of privacy to individuals. These include, for example, ensuring that personal data are 
automatically protected by default, being preventative and not remedial, and always keeping 
the interests of the end user in mind (i.e. remaining user-centric). 
Nudging privacy behaviour 
Empirical findings about human behaviour are increasingly being taken into consideration by policy-
makers worldwide and incorporated into policy initiatives across different policy areas (Sunstein, 
2000; Shafir, 2013; van Bavel, Herrmann, Esposito and Proestakis, 2013; Lunn, 2014; World Bank, 
2015). These findings are commonly applied to improving the background against which people 
make their decisions (the choice architecture; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). Policy-makers effectively 
become choice architects, making appropriate and small changes in the underlying environment 
that may have a large impact on people’s behaviour. In an on-line environment, the choice 
architecture includes features such as website design, warnings, and defaults (Sunstein, 2013).  
An important behavioural insight is that the more our activities are routinized, repeated on a daily 
basis, the more people think fast (Kahneman, 2011). This is particularly interesting for daily digital 
activities, involving e-mail or Internet browsing, for example. Such activities are often repetitive and 
systematic gestures. This is also true of on-line terms and conditions, or privacy notices, which we 
very often accept without reading. Changing them requires the appropriate tools which tap into this 
automatic behaviour, not tools that require effort and deliberation by the user. 
This study aims to identify and test privacy nudges (Acquisti, 2009; Acquisti, 2010a; Acquisti, 
Brandimarte & Loewenstein, 2015; John, Acquisti & Loewenstein, 2009; Wang, Leon, Scott, Chen, 
Acquisti & Cranor, 2013), similar to visceral notices (Calo, 2012; Groom & Calo, 2011), as 
alternative and complementary measures for personal data protection7. Privacy nudges are not 
meant to replace the notice and choice system per se, but rather to improve it and provide more 
suitable, flexible and effective privacy-protective mechanisms.  
                                                 
7  See Calo (2014) for a detailed discussion of the difference between a code, a nudge and a notice in 
privacy behaviour. 
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Unlike traditional privacy notices that rely on text or symbols to convey information, nudges or 
visceral notices 'leverage a consumer's very experience of a product or service to warn or inform’ 
(Calo, 2012). Previous experiments on visceral notices (Groom & Calo, 2011) not only demonstrated 
the weaknesses of traditional explicit notices, but also that other notice strategies can be 
successful at eliciting privacy-protective behaviour. This study builds on these results and follows 
the same empirical tradition. 
 
III. Research design  
The study is based on an on-line experiment inspired by Groom and Calo's (2011) research, but 
with a much larger sample (3,229 participants) and in more countries (Germany, Italy, the UK and 
Poland). This selection allowed us to get results from the north, south, east and centre of the EU.  
Data collection 
The data were collected between March and June 2014 by Harris Interactive under the guidance of 
University Tor Vergata. Harris first prepared a sample plan for recruiting a representative group of 
participants from four European countries. Then, based on the sample plan, they set quotas to 
balance demographic variables and performed real-time quota management during the run of the 
study. All participants were randomly assigned to one of the seven experimental conditions or the 
control group. In order to participate in the survey, participants had to: 
 Be at least 18 years old   
 Be connected to the Internet from the appropriate country, among the four countries chosen for 
the study 
 Have a reliable Internet connection  
A pilot with 263 participants (assigned randomly to the various conditions) was run before the 
actual experiment, using Amazon MTurk. This allowed for changes and adjustments in the design of 
the experiment.  
Experimental protocol 
Participants were assigned to one of the seven experimental conditions (or the control group) and 
asked to use and then evaluate a mock search engine. However, this was a pretext – the real 
purpose of the experiment was to observe their behaviour. The study targeted around 400 subjects 
per experimental condition and around 100 subjects per experimental condition per Member State. 
The internal Evaluation Committee set up at the Institute for Prospective Technological Studies 
approached this study as an on-line split ballot questionnaire and sought adherence to the 
appropriate ethical guidelines for conducting surveys. Informed consent was obtained from all 
participants in the study, according to the Terms of Services and Privacy Policy of Harris 
Interactive8. Participants were debriefed about the purpose of the study at the end of the 
experiment. 
The mock search engine was capable of searching for the answers to a set of sixteen pre-
established questions. This mock search engine merely consisted of a website interface; no actual 
search technology was created. In other words, the search engine website interface simply 
connected to an existing search engine (Google).  
The mock search engine had an ad-hoc name ('Re-Search Engine'), a logo, a search box and, below, 
an area displaying search results. The search engine interface was translated into the languages of 
                                                 
8  These documents cover issues ranging from confidentiality to consent and voluntary participation: 
https://join.harrispollonline.com/?sid=068bbad9-0651-46dc-8083-08eecfcf7aed# 
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the four countries selected. It was also adapted and modified according to the needs of the seven 
experimental conditions or control group described in the next section. 
The mock search engine could direct participants to existing external webpages. However, it was 
ensured that the subjects returned to the mock search engine website once they had found the 
answers to the search queries, so that they continued with the experiment. The questions that the 
participants were asked were displayed above the search box. Below the search box, another box 
was provided in which participants could type their responses. 
The fact that the study's setting was somewhat artificial might have had an impact on absolute 
results. Participants were aware that they were participating in a study, and knew that their privacy 
would in fact always be guaranteed by the Privacy Policy of Harris Interactive, with whom they had 
signed a prior agreement. This might have led them to disclose more personal information that 
would have normally been the case. However, results in an experiment will never accurately reflect 
behaviour in the 'real world'. The objective, therefore, should be to observe the comparative impact 
of different treatments on behaviour, not their absolute impact. This comparison should not be 
subject to bias, since all experimental conditions are subject to the same overall environment.  
Finally, at the end of the experiment the software displayed separate pages, with the 
questionnaires on Internet use and on the user interaction with the search engine. The 
questionnaires were also translated into all the languages of the four selected EU Member States. 
The experiment lasted an average of twenty-three minutes. Participants were asked to use the 
search engine to find the answers to four general knowledge questions. These searches allowed for 
the collection of information on the IP address of participants' computers, the web browser used 
and web pages that were visited (which would be relevant later on). Participation in the experiment 
could not be discontinued, otherwise it would be considered invalid.  
Experimental conditions 
The eight experimental conditions closely followed the experimental conditions first used by Groom 
and Calo (2011). However, unlike Groom and Calo, all conditions, except for the control group, 
included a link to a privacy notice. This is more in line with the European Data Protection regime 
and with the current practices of existing websites, and allowed us to compare like and like. Had we 
included a privacy notice link in some conditions and not others, we would not have been able to 
assign causality to a single variable. This would also allow for testing users' willingness to read 
privacy policies, whether simplified or not, after a treatment. The eight experimental conditions 
were as follows (see illustrations in Annex 1): 
 Control: The search engine did not include any privacy notice. Otherwise it displayed the same 
appearance as the other conditions (except for the informality condition). Nuances of blue or 
grey were used throughout the webpages to transmit authority and seriousness. 
 Traditional: This experimental condition displayed a clickable privacy policy link at the top of the 
far-right column. Clicking the link would open a page displaying a traditional privacy notice, 
consisting of written text, explaining precisely what data were going to be collected by the 
mock search engine and how these data would be used. 
 Simplified: This experimental condition displayed the same link to a privacy notice as in the 
traditional condition, but which led to a much simpler version of the same notice. The same 
information was conveyed in simpler language and with the help of a table. 
 Static agent: An anthropomorphic character displayed from the shoulders up which appeared in 
the right column in line with the search box with a text written below.  Participants were able to 
see a static image of this agent with the words 'what would you like to search for?' beneath it. 
The agent had the appearance of a customer service agent. 
 Interactive agent: Included the same anthropomorphic character and the same text as in the 
static agent condition, but with moving head and eyes tracking cursor movements. 
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 Informality: The overall appearance of the search engine website was adjusted to convey a 
more informal and youthful look and feel than the others. It had bright yellow background with 
green and blue accents and red text, with softer lines in the logo and title, rounded shapes for 
the buttons and Comic Sans font. The content and structure were the same as the other seven 
conditions. 
 IP information: This condition displayed the participants' real IP, location and the browser that 
they were using on the right side of the search engine webpage. The three corresponding 
messages were: "Your IP is […]"; "Your current location is […]"; "Your current browser is […]". This 
information was collected for all participants and explained in the privacy policy, though it was 
only visibly displayed to the participants in this condition. 
 History: This condition displayed the URL of each external website visited during the search 
experience on the right side of the search engine webpage. This information appeared in line 
with the search box. When participants visited a new site, the corresponding URL appeared at 
the top of the list. Click-stream data were collected for all participants and this was clarified in 
the privacy notices, though it was visibly displayed only to the participants in this condition. 
Behavioural output measures 
The experiment measured two types of personal data disclosure by participants: passive and direct. 
 Passive disclosure was measured by the number of 'sensitive' questions answered. Participants 
were shown four sets of three questions in sequence and asked to find the answer to one of 
the questions in each set. This led to a total of four questions being answered. In each of the 
four sets, the answer to one of the questions would reveal (albeit indirectly) personal 
information, such as information on participants' bank, their home town or their year of birth 
(e.g. 'what year was your bank founded?'). The other questions did not require the user to reveal 
any personal information whatsoever. Participants’ choice of question to answer is therefore a 
measure of their passive disclosure of personal information.  
 Direct disclosure was measured by the number of questions answered about engaging in 
socially stigmatised behaviour9. Participants could answer never, once or twice, sometimes, or 
frequently, but – crucially – they also had possibility to not answer at all. In other words, 
responding was optional. The number of times that the respondents decided to answer such 
questions, despite being optional, formed the basis for the measure of direct disclosure10.  
Questionnaire 
Complementary measures were collected through the responses to a number of additional 
questions (see Annex 2), structured as follows: 
 Participants' usual internet usage11. 
 Participants' interaction with the search engine site. The possible answers here were structured 
in a 7-point Likert scale and ranged from strongly disagree to strongly agree12. The purpose 
was to have additional results on perceived difference with a real search engine to see how it 
changed according to experimental condition.  
 Items related to the search engine, aiming to verify users' level of awareness of online tracking 
practices and of privacy concerns. The possible answers were also structured in a 7-point Likert 
scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree13.  
                                                 
9   E.g. ‘Have you ever looked at pornographic material?’ 
10  Providing false data is also a common privacy strategy, but since responding was optional, it was 
assumed respondents did not have to resort to that. 
11  E.g. ‘What browser do you typically use?’ 
12  E.g. 'Do you think the search engine you tested is easier to use than the search engine that you typically 
use?'  
13  E.g. 'The search engine website was able to detect several pieces of information about my online activity.' 
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 Items aimed at measuring whether participants had noticed some elements during the 
experiment, even in the case where these elements were not present at the website14.  The 
purpose was to test whether noticing these elements may affect their predisposition to disclose 
personal information.  
 Socio-demographic data (e.g. age, education level, and current employment situation). 
 Exit questions relating to the goal of the study, the device they used to take the survey, etc.   
 
IV. Results  
Sample characteristics and socio-demographics are presented in detail in Annex 3. 
Behavioural output measures 
Passive disclosure  
The experiment originally included four sets of three questions for measuring passive disclosure. 
However, in preliminary analyses one of these sets showed a disproportionate number of 
participants choosing to answer the sensitive question compared to the other sets. The question 
was 'what is the street address of a post office in the town where you live?', and 64% of subjects 
chose to answer it. In the other sets, the personal questions were chosen by 24%, 30% and 19% of 
subjects. This was puzzling, and might have been due to the fact that this question required no 
search, as people are often familiar with the street of their local post office. For this reason, the set 
was omitted from subsequent analyses. 
A probit model was used to test differences in passive disclosure15. Choosing to answer at least one 
sensitive question scored 1; not choosing any sensitive questions scored 0. In the model, the 
dependent variable was passive disclosure, and the independent variables were treatment, country, 
gender, education level and age (see Table 1). 
 
Experimental treatments  
Participants assigned to the static anthropomorphic condition disclosed more personal information 
than participants in the rest of conditions. Almost 60% of them chose to answer at least one 
personal question (Figure 2). They were followed by participants in the dynamic anthropomorphic 
condition (57% chose to answer at least one personal question). 
The probit regression confirms these results: the only experimental treatments that had an effect 
on passive disclosure were static and dynamic anthropomorphic characters. Subjects who visualized 
these characters were more likely to answer questions that revealed personal information than 
subjects in the control group (see Table 2). In the static anthropomorphic condition, this difference 
is significant at a 95% confidence level; in the dynamic anthropomorphic, at a 90% level (Table 2).  
This result may be explained by the fact that, as demonstrated elsewhere in the literature, 
anthropomorphic images increase trust in on-line transactions (e.g. Bente et al., 2014). And with 
this increased trust comes less vigilant behaviour which leads to inadvertent disclosures of 
personal information.  
                                                 
14   E.g. ‘While you were answering the quiz questions, did you notice an IP address?’ 
15  The aim of the probit model is to estimate the probability that an observation with particular 
characteristics will fall into one of two categories. 
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Table 1: Probit regression for passive disclosure with Control and Italy as baselines for 
treatment and country 
  VARIABLES Passive Disclosure  
Treatment 
Traditional  .1241855    
Simplified  .1404511    
Anthropomorphic Dynamic  .1616479*    
Anthropomorphic Static  .2036759 **   
Informal  .0327754    
IP  .0758884    
History  .0562358    
Country 
Germany -.3469802***    
Poland -.3338886*** 
UK -.3709523*** 
 
Other 
Gender .0225792    
Education level -.1060172***    
Age .084415**    
 Constant -.0576963    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Treatment: Control = 1; Country: Italy = 1; Gender: Female = 1; Education level: College attendees = 1 
Age: >42 = 1 
 
 
Figure 2: Subjects’ passive disclosure by treatment in percentage 
 
 
 
Country of residence 
Participants in Italy revealed more personal information inadvertently: almost a 65% of them chose 
to answer at least one of the sensitive items. On the other hand, in the other three countries 
(Germany, Poland and the UK) between 48-49% of the subjects were able to avoid revealing 
personal information in this way (Figure 3). Table 3 shows information on how many participants 
chose to answer more than one of the sensitive items. In Italy, more subjects chose all 3 sensitive 
items. 
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In the probit model, taking Italy as the baseline country, there is a statistically significant difference 
between participants in this country and those in Germany, Poland and the UK (p < 0.001, Table 2). 
No other significant country differences were found. 
 
Figure 3: Subjects’ passive disclosure by country in percentage 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Passive disclosure by Country: number of sensitive items answered  
Country 0 1 2 3 Total 
Germany 390 293 117 13 813 
Italy 282 304 169 44 799 
Poland 387 302 91 23 803 
UK 404 314 87 9 814 
Total 1,463 1,213 464 89 3,229 
 
Gender 
No significant differences were found for passive disclosure according to gender (Table 2).  
Education 
For analytical purposes, subjects were merged into two categories: those who had at least attended 
college and those who never attended college. Participants who had a higher level of education 
were less likely to answer sensitive items (p<0.001; Table 2). 48% of the more educated group 
avoided answering sensitive questions, compared to 42% of less educated participants.  
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Figure 4: Subjects’ passive disclosure by education level in percentage 
 
 
 
Age 
Participants were split into two groups with the objective to compare between younger vs. older 
individuals). The 'younger' group included participants between 18 and 41 years old. The 'older' 
group included subjects who were 42 years old or more. The option “I prefer not to answer” was 
also registered. 
The results of the probit model show that older participants passively revealed more information 
than younger participants (p < 0.05; Table 2). Almost 56% of them chose to answer at least one 
personal question, compared to 53% of younger participants (Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5: Subjects’ passive disclosure by age in percentage 
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Direct disclosure 
The results of the impact of treatments on direct disclosure were measured with a Poisson model, 
in which the dependent variable (direct disclosure) is a count. The possible outcomes were to 
answer positively to 1 to 10 stigmatised behaviours or not to answer any of them, or answer 
negatively (i.e. 'never') to all of them, scoring 0. In the proposed model, the dependent variable is 
direct disclosure, and the independent variables are treatments, country, gender, education level 
and age (see Table 3). 
 
Table 3: Poisson regression for direct disclosure with Control and Italy as baselines for 
treatment and country  
  VARIABLES Direct Disclosure  
Treatments 
Traditional  .0670005*    
Simplified  .0315333    
Anthropomorphic Dynamic  .0688383*     
Anthropomorphic Static  .0639918       
Informal  .0201771    
IP  .0206437    
History  .0555555    
Country 
Germany .1450458***    
Poland .3489893*** 
UK .2063947*** 
 
Other 
Gender -.185638***     
Education level -.0199921    
Age -.0816732***    
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Treatment: Control = 1 
Country: Italy = 1; Gender: Female = 1; Education level: College attendees = 1; Age: >42 = 1 
 
 
Treatments  
The results reveal that, subjects who visualized the anthropomorphic character in its dynamic 
condition were more likely to answer stigmatised personal questions compared to the control group 
(p < 0.10; Table 3). This outcome partially corroborates the results obtained for passive disclosure. 
It would seem that anthropomorphic images increase subjects’ predisposition to disclose personal 
information, either wittingly or unwittingly.  
However, the traditional treatment (displaying a clickable privacy policy link) also shows a positive 
coefficient which is significant at a 90% level of confidence (Table 3). Subjects exposed to a 
privacy link, without an additional nudge, in the search engine revealed more personal information 
than subjects who did not see a privacy link (control treatment). Perhaps, seeing a privacy policy 
link reassured participants and made them believe that their answers would not be shared, as 
people often think of a privacy policy as some kind of guarantee of privacy (Hoofnagle and King, 
2008). However, this should have also applied, to a certain degree, to others who saw the privacy 
link alongside other nudges.  
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Country 
Even though participants in Italy revealed the most personal information in passive disclosure, in 
direct disclosure they revealed less than the other countries. Approximately 75% of participants in 
Italy chose to answer positively to at least one stigmatised question, compared to 81% in Poland, 
83% in Germany and 92% in the UK (Figure 6).  
 
Figure 6: Subjects’ direct disclosure by country in percentage 
 
 
 
Gender 
Female participants directly disclosed less information about personal and stigmatised behaviour 
than men (p<0.001; Table 3). Approximately 73% of women answered 'never' to the stigmatised 
questions (males 27%; Figure 7). Women were also more likely to avoid answering to this set of 
items: 57% compared to a 43% of men (Table 4). 
 
Figure 7: Subjects’ who answered “Never” to all the direct disclosure items 
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Table 4: Direct disclosure by gender: percentage of subjects by type of answer (%) 
 Answered Never Answered Affirmatively 
(to at least one question) 
No Answer 
Male 27.46 51.87 43.18 
Female 72.54 48.13 56.82 
 
Education 
No significant differences were found for direct disclosure according to education (Table 3).   
Age 
The Poisson analysis shows that the group of participants aged 42 and above revealed less 
stigmatised information (p<0.001; Table 5) than the younger group. Although a greater number of 
older participants answered positively to 6 or fewer stigmatised questions, a greater number of 
younger subjects answered 8 or more stigmatised questions (Figure 8). These results are contrary 
to those of passive disclosure, where older participants revealed more information.  
 
Figure 8: Subjects’ direct disclosure by age in absolute value 
 
 
 
The results confirm that passive and direct disclosure are two different constructs, intended to 
capture different ways of revealing personal information. Indeed, the correlation between both is 
very low (Table 5).  
 
Table 5: Correlation between passive and direct disclosure 
 Passive disclosure Direct disclosure 
Passive disclosure 1.0000  
Direct disclosure  0.0253 1.0000 
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Self-reported measures 
 
In addition to the measures of behaviour outlined above, the experiment included a questionnaire. 
The questionnaire items sought to capture (a) disclosure perception, i.e. subjects' awareness that 
the quiz questions could reveal personal information about themselves, (b) feeling of being 
observed / monitored, i.e. whether subjects felt their on-line behaviour was being tracked and their 
degree of comfort in answering questions as a consequence and (c) privacy policy link awareness, 
i.e. whether subjects saw the link to a privacy notice. Since the questionnaire was completed after 
exposure to the experimental treatments, these constructs could have also been affected by them.  
 
Disclosure perception 
 
This construct was measured by a single item ('my answers to the quiz questions revealed personal 
information about myself'). Subjects indicated their agreement with the statement on a seven-point 
Likert scale ranging from 'strongly agree' to 'strongly disagree'. An ordered probit model tested 
differences for this item (Table 6)16. Treatments, country, gender, education level and age were 
introduced as independent variables in the model (see Table 6).  
 
Table 6: Ordered probit regression for disclosure perception with Control and Italy as 
baselines for treatment and country 
  VARIABLES Disclosure Perception  
Treatments 
Traditional  .0278351       
Simplified  -.0052195    
Anthropomorphic Dynamic  -.0024431    
Anthropomorphic Static  -.0123343    
Informal  .0208297    
IP  -.0796003    
History  .0652004    
Country 
Germany .3857499***    
Poland .3367445*** 
UK .0541955    
 
Other 
Gender .1104099***     
Education level .0902366*** 
Age -.0157353    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Treatment: Control = 1; Country: Italy = 1; Gender: Female = 1; Education level: College attendants = 1; 
Age: >42 = 1 
 
Treatments  
No significant effect for disclosure perception was found according to experimental treatments. 
Country  
In Germany, subjects perceived more information disclosure (M = 5.16, SD = 1.79), followed by 
subjects in Poland (M = 5.05; SD = 1.91), the UK (M = 4.62; SD = 1.83) and Italy (M = 4.50; SD = 
1.89). Figure 9 compares means for disclosure perception. 
 
                                                 
16  Ordered probit is a generalisation of the probit analysis to cases with more than two outcomes of an 
ordinal dependent variable. 
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The ordered probit analysis shows that subjects in Italy were least likely to believe they had 
disclosed information compared to those in Germany and Poland (p < 0.01). However, there was no 
significant difference compared to those in the UK (Table 6).   
When the baseline country for the ordered probit regression was changed from Italy to Germany, 
subjects from the UK were less likely to perceive they had disclosed personal information 
compared to subjects from Germany (p < 0.01). The same happened when Poland was taken as a 
baseline country (Table 7): subjects from the UK were less likely to believe they had disclosed 
personal information (p < 0.01). No significant differences were found between Germany and 
Poland.  
 
Figure 9: Mean level of disclosure perception by country of residence 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Ordered probit regression for disclosure perception with Germany as baseline 
country 
 
  VARIABLES Disclosure perception  
Country 
Italy -.3857499***    
Poland -.0490054    
UK -.3315544***     
 
 
Table 8: Ordered probit regression for disclosure perception with Poland as baseline 
country 
 
  VARIABLES Disclosure perception  
Country 
Germany .0490054    
Italy -.3367445*** 
UK -.282549***     
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Gender 
Women were more likely to believe their answers to the quiz questions revealed personal 
information about themselves (p < 0.01, Table 6).  Figure 10 shows mean level of disclosure 
perception by gender (women: M = 4.9; SD = 1.87; men: M = 4.7; SD = 1.87). 
Figure 10: Mean level of disclosure perception by gender 
 
 
 
Education 
Subjects with a higher level of education perceived they had disclosed more information than those 
with a lower level of education (p < 0.01; Table 6). Subjects who had attended college had a higher 
mean level (M = 4.86; SD = 1.90) than those who had not (M = 4.78; SD = 1.85; Figure 11). 
Figure 11: Mean level of disclosure perception by education level 
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Age 
No significant effect for disclosure perception was found according to age. 
 
Feeling of being observed / monitored  
This construct was measured by three items: 'I felt comfortable answering personal questions 
during this study' (Q36, reversed), 'I felt observed during this study' (Q37), and 'I felt I was being 
monitored during this study' (Q38). Participants rated each item on a seven-point Likert scale 
ranging from 'strongly disagree' to 'strongly agree'. The higher this construct scores, the more they 
felt their actions were noted while participating in the experiment.  
 
Table 9: Correlation between items of the feeling of being observed / monitored 
 Q36 Q37 Q38 
Q36 1.0000   
Q37  0.2878 1.0000  
Q38 0.2984 0.8165 1.0000 
 
 
Table 10: Ordered probit regression for the feeling of being observed / monitored with 
Control and Italy as baselines for treatment and country 
  VARIABLES 
Feeling of being observed / 
monitored  
Treatments 
Traditional  -.0176888    
Simplified  .0507388    
Anthropomorphic Dynamic  -.060725    
Anthropomorphic Static  .0399455    
Informal  -.0080207    
IP  -.0411596    
History  .0734501    
Country 
Germany .3933074***    
Poland .0842225* 
UK .1820166***    
 
Other 
Gender -.1661339*** 
Education level -.2312539*** 
Age .1587669***    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Treatment: Control = 1; Country: Italy = 1; Gender: Female = 1; Education level: College attendants = 1; 
Age: >42 = 1 
 
The latent variable feeling of being observed / monitored presents high reliability (α = 0.7285)17. 
Eliminating item 36 increased the reliability of the construct (α = 0.8989). However, that item was 
                                                 
17  Hinton, Brownlow, McMurray & Cozens (2004) suggest four cut-off points, which involve excellent 
reliability (0.90 and above), high reliability (0.70-0.90), moderate reliability (0.50 -0.70), and low reliability 
(0.50 and below). 
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kept in order to ensure the robustness of results. Correlations were very high between item 37 and 
item 38 (0.8165), but lower between 37 and 36 (Table 9).  
An ordered probit model tested for differences in this construct, where treatments, country, gender, 
education level and age were introduced as independent variables (Table 10). The control condition 
and Italy were the baselines for treatment and country. 
Treatments  
No significant effect for feeling of being observed / monitored was found according to experimental 
treatments. 
Country 
In Italy, subjects felt less monitored while using the website (M = 4.15, SD = 1.54), followed by 
Poland (M = 4.29; SD = 1.62), the UK (M = 4.42; SD = 1.34) and Germany (M = 4.89; SD = 1.55) 
(Figure 12).  
 
Figure 12: Mean feeling of being observed / monitored by country of residence 
 
 
Participants in Italy did not feel they were being observed (Table 10) as much as those in the rest 
of the countries (p < 0.01 for Germany and the UK; p < 0.1 for Poland).   
If Germany is taken as baseline country, subjects from Poland and the UK seem to feel less 
monitored or observed than participants from Germany (p < 0.01; Table 11).  
When taking Poland as the reference, there are also significant differences showing that subject 
from the UK felt more monitored than those in Poland (p < 0.01; Table 12).  
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Table 11: Ordered probit regression for the feeling of being observed / monitored with 
Germany as baseline country 
  VARIABLES 
Feeling of being observed / 
monitored  
Country 
Italy -.3933074***    
Poland -.309085*** 
UK -.2112908***     
 
 
Table 12: Ordered probit regression for the feeling of being observed / monitored with 
Poland as baseline country 
  VARIABLES 
Feeling of being observed / 
monitored  
Country 
Germany .309085*** 
Italy -.0842225* 
UK .0977942*     
 
Gender 
The ordered probit regression reveals that females felt significantly less observed than males (p < 
0.01; Table 10). Their average score in this item was 4.38 (SD = 1.59), compared to 4.51 (SD = 
1.49) for males (Figure 13). 
 
Figure 13: Mean feeling of being observed / monitored by gender 
 
 
 
Education 
Subjects with a higher level of education felt significantly less (p < 0.01; Table 10) observed or 
monitored (M = 4.25, SD = 1.49) than those with a lower level of education (M = 4.66, SD = 1.54; 
Figure 14).  
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Age 
Younger participants felt significantly less (p < 0.01; Table 11) observed or monitored (M = 4.18, SD 
= 1.54) than older participants (M = 4.67, SD = 1.47; Figure 15). 
 
 
Figure 14: Mean feeling of being observed / monitored by education level 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Mean feeling of being observed / monitored by age 
 
 
 
Privacy policy link awareness 
For this construct, subjects were asked whether they had noticed a privacy policy link in the search 
engine website with two possible answers ('I noticed it' or 'I didn’t notice it'). Differences were 
tested with a probit model. In this regression, the dependent variable can only take two values and 
the independent variables are treatments, country, gender, education level and age (see Table 13). 
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Treatments  
Subjects exposed to the dynamic anthropomorphic, IP address or history treatments were more 
likely to notice the privacy policy link (Table 13). 
Country 
Fewer subjects in the UK noticed the privacy policy link during the experiment (92% did not notice 
the link) compared to the other countries (88% in Germany, 86% in Italy and 87% in Poland; Figure 
16).  
Table 13: Probit regression for privacy policy link awareness with Control and Italy as 
baselines for treatment and country 
  VARIABLES 
Privacy policy link 
awareness  
Treatments 
Traditional  .1991768    
Simplified  .1976527    
Anthropomorphic Dynamic  .3314248***    
Anthropomorphic Static  .1674936    
Informal  .0829997    
IP  .2826691**    
History  .3226029***    
Country 
Germany -.0755753    
Poland -.051806    
UK -.3335011***     
 
Other 
Gender -.1269112***    
Education level .1117372   *** 
Age -.102267*    
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Treatment: Control = 1 
Country: Italy = 1; Gender: Female = 1; Education level: College attendants = 1; Age: >42 = 1 
 
Participants in Italy were more likely to notice the privacy policy link than subjects in the UK (p < 
0.01; Table 13).  
If Germany is taken as baseline country, subjects from the UK were less likely to have noticed the 
privacy policy link, although there were no differences with the other two countries (p < 0.01; Table 
14).  
When Poland is the reference, there are also significant differences showing that subjects from the 
UK were less likely to see the privacy policy link. No differences were found with the other two 
countries (p < 0.01; Table 15).  
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Figure 16: Privacy policy link awareness by country in percentage 
 
 
 
Table 14: Probit regression for privacy policy link awareness with Germany as baseline 
country 
  VARIABLES 
Privacy policy link 
awareness 
Country 
Italy .0755753    
Poland .0237693    
UK -.2579258***    
 
Table 15: Probit regression for privacy policy link awareness with Poland as baseline 
country 
  VARIABLES 
Privacy policy link 
awareness 
Country 
Germany -.0237693    
Italy .051806    
UK -.2816951***    
 
Gender 
Females were less likely to notice the privacy link than males (p < 0.01; Table 14). A lower 
percentage of women (Figure 17) noticed the privacy policy link (9%) than males (12%). 
 
Education 
Subjects with a higher level of education were more prone to notice the privacy policy link than 
those with a lower level of education (p < 0.01; Table 13). 54% of subjects who attended college 
reported noticing the link, compared with 46% of those who never attended college.  
Age 
Younger participants were more likely to notice the privacy policy link than older ones (p < 0.10; 
Table 14). 54% of younger participants reported noticing the link, compared to 46% of older ones. 
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Figure 17: Privacy policy link awareness by gender in percentage 
 
 
 
 
V.  Discussion and conclusion 
This report set out to explore whether changes in the choice architecture of a web interface had an 
effect on privacy behaviour. It also observed whether less tangible psychological constructs were 
affected by these changes, and also conducted a demographic analysis according to gender, age, 
education and country of residence. 
 
Effect of experimental treatments 
Results suggest people's disclosure of personal information is not oblivious to changes in the 
choice architecture. Both dynamic and static anthropomorphic conditions had an effect on passive 
disclosure. Traditional and dynamic anthropomorphic treatments also had a weak effect on direct 
disclosure. In both cases, the anthropomorphic characters led people to reveal more personal 
information (not less, as suggested by Groom and Calo, 2011). Perhaps this was due to 
anthropomorphic characters increasing levels of trust and inviting greater disclosure of personal 
information, as shown elsewhere in the literature (Bente et al., 2014). 
However, none of the treatments had an effect on psychological constructs such as the awareness 
that the answers to the quiz questions revealed personal information, or the feeling of being 
monitored and the degree of comfort when answering questions. This would seem to confirm that 
these nudges have an impact on automatic behaviour (the kind Kahneman, 2011, refers to as 
System 1) rather than behaviour which is guided by in-depth thinking (i.e. System 2). If this is true, 
they are particularly relevant for habitual and instinctive on-line behaviour. 
Changes in the choice architecture did have an effect on whether or not participants noticed the 
privacy policy link. The presence of an anthropomorphic character (the 'dynamic' one), a line 
showing the participants' IP address and a listing of prior browsing history all made it more likely 
that respondents would notice the link. However, noticing the link was not correlated with either 
passive or direct disclosure.  
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Country differences 
The study revealed differences in observed behaviour and self-reported answers to a questionnaire 
according to demographic variables. With regard to country of residence, subjects from Italy 
revealed the most personal information inadvertently. In addition, they were (a) the least aware 
that quiz questions revealed personal information about themselves, (b) the ones who felt least 
observed / most comfortable answering questions, and (c) the ones least likely to disclose personal 
information directly. 
However, the most relevant finding with regard to country differences was that significant country 
differences existed between all countries for direct disclosure (while for passive disclosure only 
Italy stood out). This would suggest there is an interesting relationship between culture and 
information disclosure, which merits further investigation. 
 
Gender 
With regard to gender, approximately 73% of women answered 'never' to the stigmatized 
questions, compared to 27% of men. This is a very large difference, and could be because some of 
the questions (e.g. about alcohol consumption) were less problematic for men to answer. It could 
also suggest women feel they are under greater social scrutiny, or simply are far more cautious 
when disclosing personal information. Further qualitative investigation could help to shed light on 
the causes of this difference.  
Neither women nor men were more likely than the other to reveal personal information unwittingly, 
although women were more aware that the answers to the quiz questions revealed personal 
information about them. Men, however, felt more observed and less comfortable answering 
questions than women.  
 
Education 
With regard to education, subjects who had attended (though not necessarily graduated from) 
college felt significantly less observed or monitored and more comfortable answering questions 
than those who never went to college. This is an odd result, which challenges the assumption that 
the better educated are more aware of information tracking practices. Further investigation, 
perhaps of a qualitative nature, could help dig deeper into this issue. 
Also, people with a lower level of education were more likely to reveal personal information 
unwittingly than subjects with a higher level of education. It was also not because they had a 
greater willingness to reveal personal information, since results for the direct disclosure measure 
show no difference. It is more likely that this is due to the fact that non-college attendees simply 
were less aware that the answers to the quiz questions revealed personal information about 
themselves. 
 
Age 
Finally, with regard to age, older people (over 41) tended to reveal more personal information 
inadvertently. There was also a difference in direct disclosure, but in the opposite direction as older 
individuals revealed less when they were asked directly. No differences were found in the belief 
that the answers to personal questions revealed information about themselves. However, they did 
feel more observed / less comfortable when answering questions. 
These differences all have potential policy implications. For example, recognising that there are 
differences in cultural patterns of privacy behaviour could make differentiated implementation of 
data protection regulation across countries possible. The fact that education plays such an 
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important role has implications for education policy and the promotion of digital skills. And 
differences according to age should inform social policy, which aims to ensure no generation is left 
behind in the information society. 
 
A final word… 
By conducting an experiment on privacy nudges, this report has attempted to bring behavioural 
research methods for privacy to the attention of European policy-makers. It has considered the 
opportunities and challenges of applying behavioural insights to privacy legal frameworks. 
However, this study has its limits. It has only targeted a sample of users in four countries in an 
experimental setting (even though every effort was made to ensure that the experiment was as 
realistic as possible). The question still remains: how would hundreds of thousands of people react 
to these changes in a real-life setting? 
The major web service providers (e.g. Google, Facebook, Twitter) are likely to have extensive 
amounts of data on how slight changes to their services’ privacy controls affect users’ privacy 
behaviour. One policy recommendation, therefore, is that national and European privacy 
enforcement authorities should work with these providers to leverage this data to inform 
appropriate privacy and data protection rules, regulations, laws, and legislation. These service 
providers should not be forced to hand over this data; rather, they could work together, in 
partnership, to arrive at recommendations for web interface design that allow for an aware 
disclosure of privacy information.   
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Annex 1  
Screenshots of the experimental conditions 
1. Control  
 
 
2. Traditional  
 
 
3. Simplified  
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4. Static agent 
 
5. Interactive agent 
 
6. Informality 
 
 
 
 33 
7. IP information 
 
8. History  
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Annex 2 
Questionnaire 
I. Trivia Questions 
1. What is the current Queen of Norway's birthday? 
2. What is the high temperature today in Hammamet, Tunisia? 
3. What is the name of the national opera house in Kiev? 
4. Who is the current European Commissioner for Development? 
II. Passive Disclosure 
Sensitive Questions in Italics 
Set 1: 
5. Find a recipe for chocolate cake and list all the ingredients 
6. Provide the name of the winner at the Eurovision song contest in 1978 
7. Provide the name of a famous public figure or celebrity born the same year as you  
Set 2:  
8. What is the street address of a post office in the town where you live? 
9. What is the date of the first full moon in the year 2017? 
10. On what date was the highest temperature in the U.S.A. recorded? 
Set 3: 
11. In what year was the bank you use founded? 
12. Which years marked the beginning and the end of the Crimean War? 
13. Which Shakespeare play was first performed in 1604? 
Set 4: 
14. What are the names of three of the moons of Neptune? 
15. What is the full name of the 81st element in the periodic table? 
16. What is the address of your favourite restaurant located in the town where you were born? 
III. Internet usage 
17. What browser do you typically use? 
18. What operating system do you typically use? 
19. What search engine do you typically use? 
20. Are you a member of a social networking site, such as Facebook? 
IV. Search engine 
21. Do you think the search engine you tested is easier to use than the search engine that you 
typically use? 
22. Do you think the search engine you tested is more efficient in the result provided than the 
search engine that you typically use? 
23. Do you think the search engine you tested fits your needs better than the search engine 
that you typically use? 
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V. Direct Disclosure  
24. Have you ever claimed to have education that you didn't actually have? 
25. Have you ever pretended not to see a beggar to avoid being seen as stingy? 
26. Have you ever had sex with someone who was too drunk to know what they were doing? 
27. Have you ever looked at pornographic material? 
28. Have you ever had sex with the current husband, wife, or partner of a friend? 
29. Have you ever known about or witnessed a serious crime and failed to report it or stop it? 
30. Have you ever lied about your income to someone? 
31. Have you ever fantasized about having violent non-consensual sex with someone? 
32. Have you ever drunk so much that you got a hangover? 
33. Have you ever failed to tip a waiter in a country in which tipping is customary? 
VI. Answers provided 
34. My answers to the quiz questions revealed personal information about myself 
35. I felt comfortable answering personal questions during this study 
36. I felt observed during this study 
37. I felt I was being monitored during this study 
VII. Personal information captured 
38. The search engine website was able to detect several pieces of information about my 
online activity 
39. The websites you visited 
40. The web browser you used 
41. The search terms you used 
42. Your Internet Protocol (IP) address 
43. Your geographic location 
44. Your answers to the questions about web use 
45. The time you started the quiz questions 
46. The time it took for you to complete the quiz questions 
47. The year of your birth 
48. The town you are currently connected from 
VIII. Noticing elements 
49. While you were answering the quiz questions, did you notice anything unusual in the right 
side of the screen? Please describe what you noticed, if anything 
50. While you were answering the quiz questions, did you notice a link to a privacy policy for 
the search engine? 
51. While you were answering the quiz questions, did you notice a series of links to URLs you 
had visited? 
52. While you were answering the quiz questions, did you notice an IP address? 
53. While you were answering the quiz questions, did you notice a geographical location? Was it 
the correct location from which you are currently connected? 
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54. While you were answering the quiz questions, did you notice a browser name? Was it the 
correct name of the browser you are currently using? 
55. While you were answering the quiz questions, did you notice an image of a female 
character? 
IX. Socio-demographics 
56. You are: 
57. How old are you? 
58. Your education level: 
59. Your employment situation: 
60. Your personal income (net monthly salary) is: 
61. How many people live in your household, including you? 
62. Your household average income (net monthly salary) is 
63. For which political party did you vote at the last elections? 
X. Other 
64. Did you complete this study alone or with others? 
65. Where did you connect from? 
66. What device did you use to take this survey? 
67. What was the goal of this study? 
68. Do you have any comment or suggestion for this study? 
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Annex 3 
Sample characteristics and socio-demographics 
The distribution of the sample corresponded to 49% of females (Table A – Figure A). Participants 
were divided into groups of 7 years of range (e.g. 18-25, 26-33, etc.), though they were afterwards 
merged into two categories due to differences in the results of the statistical analysis conducted. 
The first group included participants between 18 and 41 vs. subjects over 42 years old, distributed 
as shown in Table B – Figure B. Participants were also allocated according to their education level 
depending on whether they had attended to college or not (Table C – Figure C).     
 
Table A: Participants’ distribution by gender 
Country Gender Frequency % Country % Sample 
Germany Female 398 48.95 12.34 
 Male 404 49.69 12.52 
 I prefer not to answer 11 1.35 0.34 
Italy Female 374 46.93 11.59 
 Male 408 51.19 12.65 
 I prefer not to answer 15 1.88 0.46 
Poland Female 394 49.13 12.21 
 Male 401 50.00 12.43 
 I prefer not to answer 7 0.87 0.22 
UK Female 402 49.39 12.46 
 Male 405 49.75 12.55 
 I prefer not to answer 7 0.86 0.22 
Total   3,226  100.00 
 
Figure A: Gender distribution of the total sample 
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Table B: Participants’ distribution by age  
Country Age Frequency % Country % Sample 
Germany 18-41 332 40.84 10.29 
 42 and above 472 58.06 14.63 
 I prefer not to answer 9 1.11 0.28 
Italy 18-41 439 55.08 13.61 
 42 and above 346 43.41 10.73 
 I prefer not to answer 12 1.51 0.37 
Poland 18-41 433 53.99 13.42 
 42 and above 361 45.01 11.19 
 I prefer not to answer 8 1.00 0.25 
UK 18-41 275 33.78 8.52 
 42 and above 529 64.99 16.40 
 I prefer not to answer 10 1.23 0.31 
Total   3,226  100.00 
 
Figure B: Age distribution of the total sample 
  
Participants’ distribution by level of education  
Country Gender Frequency % Country % Sample 
Germany Non-college 503 61.87 15.59 
 College 271 33.33 8.40 
 I prefer not to answer 39 4.80 1.21 
Italy Non-college 357 44.79 11.07 
 College 424 53.20 13.14 
 I prefer not to answer 16 2.01 0.50 
Poland Non-college 354 44.14 10.97 
 College 430 53.62 13.33 
 I prefer not to answer 18 2.24 0.56 
UK Non-college 262 32.19 8.12 
 College 533 65.48 16.52 
 I prefer not to answer 19 2.33 0.59 
Total  3,226  100.00 
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Figure C: Education level distribution of the total sample 
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